James Dickerson v. Desimone Inc by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-8-2010 
James Dickerson v. Desimone Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"James Dickerson v. Desimone Inc" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 280. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/280 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











DESIMONE, INC., doing business as DESIMONE 
AUTO GROUP; RANDY FOREMAN, doing business 
as DESIMONE AUTO GROUP; ANTHONY WEISS, 
doing business as DESIMONE AUTO GROUP 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-01551) 
District Judge:  Hon. Mary A. McLaughlin 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 2, 2010 
 
BEFORE:  SCIRICA, STAPLETON and ROTH, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 8, 2010) 
 _________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge 
 
 According to the complaint, after being advised that he had been pre-approved for 
financing, plaintiff purchased a pickup truck from defendant Desimone Auto Group, Inc., 
(“Desimone”) on January 12, 2008, and promptly replaced the spinning rims.  On January 
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21, 2008, plaintiff concluded that Desimone and its employees, the other defendants, had 
failed to secure financing on his behalf and voluntarily returned the truck the next day 
without its original spinning rims.  That same day defendant Foreman called plaintiff and 
demanded return of the original rims.  On January 24, 2008, officers of the Philadelphia 
Police Department arrived at plaintiff’s home and, after he showed them the rims of the 
truck, arrested him for theft of the rims.  The prosecution of this offense was ultimately 
nolle prossed. 
 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the sale and financing of the truck violated his 
rights under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection law, the 
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, and the Federal Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act.  It also asserts claims of abuse of process, malicious prosecution and 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on plaintiff’s arrest and the ensuing criminal 
proceedings.   
 Defendants moved to compel the arbitration of all plaintiff’s claims under an 
arbitration agreement entered into by plaintiff in connection with the truck purchase.  
They also insisted that the abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims failed to 
state a claim as a matter of law.  Significantly, while defendants maintained that the civil 
rights count should be arbitrated, their motion and brief did not argue that it failed to state 
a claim for relief.  As a result, the plaintiff’s responding brief did not address that issue.  
At oral argument, the Court asked plaintiff’s counsel a question regarding whether the 
defendants were state actors for purposes of § 1983.  In response, counsel pointed out to 
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the Court that this was ‘not an issue for the motion to dismiss,” but “off the top of [his] 
head,” gave a brief “answer [to] the Court’s question.”  24A-25A. 
 The District Court held that plaintiff’s claims for abuse of process, malicious 
prosecution and violation of plaintiff’s civil rights were not within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement.  The remaining claims, however, were found to be within the 
scope of that agreement.  The Court dismissed those remaining claims and ordered that 
they proceed to arbitration.  The abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims were 
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.  The Court sua sponte also dismissed 
with prejudice the civil rights claim for failure to state a claim. 
 Following the District Court’s decision, the plaintiff moved for reconsideration 
contending inter alia that he should be granted leave to amend his abuse of process and 
malicious prosecution claims to cure the deficiencies found by the Court.  In an 
alternative argument, plaintiff pointed out that the Court’s order dismissed all of the 
federal claims and that there was no diversity.  Plaintiff contended that under these 
circumstances the Court was required to amend its order to provide that the abuse of 
process and malicious prosecution claims were dismissed without prejudice so that they 
could be pursued in state court.  The District Court denied the motion for reconsideration 
without opinion. 
 Essentially for the reasons set forth in its opinion, we agree with the District Court 
that the arbitration agreement is unambiguous and serves to bar plaintiff’s pursuit in this 
case of those claims which it directed the parties to arbitrate. Accordingly, we will affirm 
that aspect of its judgment. 
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 The defendants are correct that a district court in some circumstances may sua 
sponte raise the issue of the deficiency of a pleading under Rule 12.  One of those 
circumstances is where the claim if dismissed would deprive the Court of jurisdiction.  
Nevertheless, even in such instances, the Court must afford a plaintiff a fair opportunity 
to address the issue before deciding it.   Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1990).  
Such a fair opportunity was not afforded here with respect to whether the civil rights 
count failed to state a claim.  Plaintiff had no notice that that issue would be submitted for 
decision at the oral argument on defendants’ motions.  We will remand so that a fair 
opportunity to address that issue can be afforded. 
 If after hearing the plaintiff on remand, the Court remains of the view that the civil 
rights claim must be dismissed, it should address his contention that it should refrain 
from exercising its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the abuse of 
process and malicious prosecution claims.  “[W]here the claim over which the district 
court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to 
decide the pendent state jurisdiction claims unless considerations of judicial economy, 
convenience and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”  
Borough of West Miffflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United Mine 
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1996)).  The current record does not establish that the 
District Court has considered this issue and, even if it has, the absence of an opinion 
regarding it deprives us of the capacity to review the Court’s exercise of discretion. 
 If the District Court dismisses the civil rights claim and exercises its discretion in 
favor of retaining supplemental jurisdiction over the abuse of process and malicious 
5 
 
prosecution claims, it should provide a brief record explanation of its affirmative 
justification for doing so.  If it retains supplemental jurisdiction and declines to grant 
leave to amend those claims, it should provide a similar explanation for that decision as 
well. 
 While we affirm the District Court’s rulings regarding arbitration, we will vacate 
its judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
